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Increasing tax revenue is an important aspect of development policy as it is associated
with sustainable economic development. This requires tax compliance, and to increase
tax compliance it is vital to understand its determinants. According to the fiscal contract
theory, people assent to pay taxes because they value what they gain from it. Because
paying taxes implies giving up a part of your personal income for the benefit of your
co-citizens, taxation becomes a classical collective action dilemma. Thus, not only the
relationship with the state, but also the relationship between the citizens should be an
important determinant of tax compliance. The main argument put forward in this paper
is that a society that aims to increase tax compliance should be a socially cohesive society,
and not only focusing on the state’s role, but also on stimulating good relations between
the citizens. Using data from the Afrobarometer survey round 5 (2011-2013), this paper
performs a logistic regression analysis across 28 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The main
finding is that the traditional approach to the fiscal contract matters the most. However,
social cohesion does provide some explanatory power in the sense that social solidarity
also increases tax compliance. There is also reason to believe that there are huge country
differences.
Elise Tengs
The Quality of Government Institute




Taxation is on the top of the development agenda. Raising domestic revenue through
taxation is especially important to poor countries as they are prone to both the ‘natural
resources curse’ and the ‘aid dependency trap’, and thus should emphasise extracting rev-
enue in a sustainable manner. The full potential for tax collection in developing countries
is far from reached, and is challenged by widespread tax evasion (Gupta & Tareq, 2008;
International Monetary Fund, 2011).1
According to fiscal contract theorists, citizens consent to pay taxes because they receive
public goods in return (Bräutigam et al., 2008; Levi, 1988; Schumpeter, 1991; Tilly, 1990).
Despite the historical origin in Western Europe, the fiscal contract theory has also been
used to explain the low level of tax compliance in developing countries. An established
strand of research tests the fiscal contract theory in developing countries, and largely find
that dissatisfaction with public services is associated with lower tax compliance(Ali et al.,
2014; Bergman, 2002; D’Arcy, 2011; Daude et al., 2012). However, they explain far from
the full picture, as they all focus on the state’s supply of public services, and/ or the
citizens’ level of satisfaction with these services, and thus neglect the relations between
the citizens.
As taxes finance public goods, it is a classical collective action problem (D’Arcy, 2011).
When choosing to enter a social contractual relationship with the state, the citizens also
consent to the same type of relationship with each other. Establishing the fiscal contract
requires the citizens to agree to share a proportion of own wealth with their co-citizens
in order to finance a welfare state. Hence, the fiscal contract is vertical; between the
citizens and the state, but also horisontal; between the citizens (D’Arcy, 2011). The
fulfilment of the former is theoretically straightforward; it requires the government to
deliver public services. The fulfilment of the latter is not so straightforward; it requires
1This Working Paper is based on my MA thesis, submitted in June 2016
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collective action between the citizens, who must agree to share a portion of their own
wealth with their co-citizens. This horistontal fiscal contract, namely that the citizens are
able to coordinate their actions towards the ruler and demand public services, cannot be
taken for granted.
This paper aims to explore factors that can explain this horisontal fiscal contract, present-
ing the following research question:
How do the relations between citizens matter for tax compliance?
The main argument put forward in this working paper is that a society that wants to
succeed in establishing a fiscal contract must be socially cohesive, in addition to provide
the necessary public goods. This is a society where the citizens solve the problem of
collective action that taxation presents; citizens accept that a part of their personal income
finances the well-being of their co-citizens. This requires high levels of social trust and
having a common national identity without salient social cleavages. The government plays
an important role in promoting these values by reducing the ethnic cleavages, promoting
economic equality, in addition to providing the necessary public services.
This is of immediate relevance to Sub-Saharan Africa, where there is a large variation
in the degree of tax capacity (Mkandawire, 2010). Figure 1 shows the percentage of tax
compliant respondents in a number of African countries, revealing huge differences between
the countries. Malawi has the smallest share of population being tax compliant, with only
28% percent. On the other side of the scale, in Mauritius, 74% of the population thinks
it is wrong not to pay the taxes one owes to the government. At the same time, the
provision of public services is poor, and the legitimacy deficit and fragmentation in many
states makes it hard to establish a social contract (Englebert, 2000, pp. 71–122).
Introducing the concept of social cohesion allows for the inclusion of even more explanatory
variables regarding the part of the fiscal contract between the citizens, such as social
values and social solidarity. Moreover, by simultaneously investigating the “original fiscal
contract”, I am able to evaluate the relative importance of the different part of the complex
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puzzle that is the fiscal contract.
Tax compliance is paying the taxes you are supposed to pay, which is a result of both
voluntary and involuntary compliance (Kirchler et al., 2008). Thus, as compliance is a
result of both voluntarily obedience and coercion based obedience, it is often referred to
as “quasi-voluntary” compliance (Levi, 1988). Tax evasion is to not pay the taxes you are
supposed to pay, whereas tax avoidance is using legal means to reduce one’s tax payments.
Only the former is strictly illegal and subject to punishment (Shaw et al., 2010, p. 1104).
According to the classic model of tax compliance, taxpayers pay only because they are
subject to coercion (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972). A tax-paying individual is a rational
actor that will consider a trade-off situation between the gain of evading taxes and the
risk of punishment. In this case, tax compliance is simply deciding whether to obey by the
law. However, the classical model fails to capture the whole concept of tax compliance as
the real level of tax compliance is in fact higher than what this model predicts (Andreoni
et al., 1998; Feld & Frey, 2007; Mascagni, 2014).
Tax compliance is important because it generates revenue for the state, but also because
tax non-compliance is an expense in itself. Coercion in the form of monitoring and sanc-
tion is costly for the state (Fjeldstad & Heggstad, 2012; Timmons, 2005). Thus, not
having to spend money and resources on coercive power will result in a cheaper and more
efficient way for the government to collect taxes, hence more revenue. It is, however,
difficult to distinguish between voluntary compliance and coercion (involuntary compli-
ance), as “[c]onceptually, the importance of tax morale depends on the enforcement envi-
ronment because tax morale and enforcement generally interact” (Luttmer and Singhal,
2014, p. 154).
This is why, in this working paper, it is primarily the concept of tax compliance that
will be used when discussing why citizens consent to pay taxes. I assume that the tax-
paying citizen will always have the level of probable punishment in mind. However, the
aim here is not to describe what makes tax payers obey by the laws in the society, but
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rather to which extent they support taxation, and because of this, consent to pay taxes
without the government having to rely primarily on coercion. Here, tax compliance is the
apprehension that paying taxes is the right thing to do. Thus, non-compliant behaviour is
not necessarily illegal, but rather the perception that not paying taxes is not necessarily
wrong.
The rest of this paper is strucured as follows: First, I outline the ’original fiscal contract
theory’, what I call the vertical fiscal contract. Next, I argue how the concept of social
cohesion provides an understanding of the fulfilment of the horisontal fiscal contract, and
present this in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa. In the third section I present the data,
including a discussion on measuring tax compliance. Next, I present an initial analysis,
following by a discussion of the preliminary findings, and some thoughs on how to move
forward with the analysis. The conclusion sums up the main findings, which is that the
state’s role - thus the vertical fiscal contract - seems to matter the most for tax compliance.
However, social cohesion can also explain tax compliance, in the form of social solidarity.
Moreover, there is reason to believe that there are cross-country differences, and the next
step should be to examine this theory and model on a country-level.
2 THEORY AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH
2.1 The Vertical Fiscal Contract
The comparative study of state formation in Western Europe done by Tilly (1990) provides
the empirical foundation for the fiscal contract. According to the historical analysis of
state building in Europe, modern states formed because of taxation. As the monarchs got
involved in expensive warfare, they had to turn to the citizens for revenue (Schumpeter,
1991, p. 105). The demand for taxation from the monarchs was a way of proving its
power: “For the ordinary citizen, the power to tax is the most familiar manifestation of
the government’s power to coerce” (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980, p. 8). The citizens met
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FIGURE 1. TAX COMPLIANT ATTITUDES ACROSS SUB SAHARAN AFRICA































the government’s demand for taxation with a demand for political influence, which is why
“taxpayers rebelled or cooperated to the extent they felt some measure of membership in
the community” (Bergman, 2002, p. 289). This resultet in the famous slogan ‘no taxation
without representation’ from the American colonies’ fight for independence from British
rule (Gloppen & Rakner, 2002). Paying taxes became a mechanism through which the
citizens themselves had certain power over the government (Brennan & Buchanan, 1980,
p. 9).
The bargaining process around taxation that leads to political power for the citizens has
the potential to “bolster the legitimacy of the state and enhance accountability between
the state and its citizens” (Bräutigam, 2008, p. 1). The evidence of this was the rise of
the different parliaments in modern Europe (Brennan & Buchanan, 1980, p. 9). Hence,
“[c]ontrols over the sovereign have been exercised through constraints on the taxing au-
thority” (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980, p. 9). D’Arcy (2011, p. 1) argues that “[w]hile
voting may be the citizen’s main action as a political actor - to determine who has access
to power, paying tax is her primary political act as an economic actor and provides that
which enables the state to exercise power”. The citizens used their newly gained power
to demand public goods. According to Schumpeter (1991), the process of demanding po-
litical influence in return for taxation, led to the development of a tax state. In a tax
state, tax revenues finances public goods: “Taxes were no longer raised merely for the
purposes for which the prince had asked them, but also for others” (Schumpeter, 1991,
p. 107). Hence, “the legitimacy of taxation has been based on the welfare [...] provided by
governments” (Bergman, 2002, p. 209). By offering public goods in return for tax revenue,
the government can increase tax compliance among the citizens.
A critical good worth paying extra attention to is security. Together with defence, law
and order “is generally regarded as the state provided service par excellence” (Therkildsen
and Semboja, 1995, p. 2). With a lack of security provided by the government, there is
an increase in the number of private security actors, as the government competes against
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traditional rulers, religious leaders and insurgents in the provision of services: “Somewhat
ironically and belying its nature as a pure public good, African citizens are increasingly
resorting to private provision of security and safety services to palliate for these public de-
ficiencies” (Van de Walle, 2003). Moreover, lack of intrastate security will hinder provision
of other public services due to instability and uncertainty (Brinkerhoff et al., 2012).
A wide range of empirical research support the proposition that public goods leads to
tax compliance, see e.g. Alm et al. (1992), Bergman (2002), Daude et al. (2012), D’Arcy
(2011), and Ali et al. (2014). The latter also find that paying non-state actors in exchange
for protection significantly reduces the probability of being tax compliant. This strand
of theory and empirical research supports what I will term “the vertical fiscal contract”,
illustrated with box A and B in Figure 2. I will test this ‘vertical fiscal contract’, formu-
lated with the following two hypotheses:
• H1a: The better the government’s public services, the higher the tax compliance
• H1b: The more payment to non-state security actor, the lower the tax compliance
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2.2 The Horisontal Fiscal Contract
When studying the fiscal contract in the context of developing countries, why can this
horisontal fiscal contract not be taken for granted? According to Migdal (1988), broadly
speaking, the society in developing countries is not cohesive. Rather, it could be described
“a mélange of social organizations” (Migdal, 1988, p. 28). Building on the understanding of
the society as fragmented, Persson and Sjöstedt (2012) present a way of understanding lack
of development by taking the focus away from the ruler, and focusing on the citizens.
Persson and Sjöstedt (2012) combine principal-agent theory and state-theory as an expla-
nation of lack of good decisions from political leaders. In line with the political appliance
of principal-agent theory, they depict the citizens as the principal, and the rulers as agents,
which gives rise to an information asymmetry. Thus, the principal – the citizens – must
also take part of the responsibility for a poor provision of public services. In states where
there is a weak social contract, the agent will face multiple principals, who fail to coordi-
nate their actions – monitoring the principal. However, “where a shared social contract
exists, the state is thought of as an instrument of collective action rather than a resource
to be appropriated” (Persson and Sjöstedt, 2012, p. 626). This social contract between the
citizens is what I will call the horisontal fiscal contract, represented with boxes C, B and
D in Figure 2.
I argue that social cohesion can help explain the horisontal fiscal contract. Central to
the concept of social cohesion is the act of working together to make the society benefit
common goals. Benard (2012, p. 108) defines cohesion as “the extent to which people
invest personal resources (e.g., time, effort, or money) in a group’s goals”. According
to Kearns and Forrest (2000, p. 1000) “a cohesive society is one in which dilemmas and
problems can be easily solved by collective action”. In a society with social cohesion,
there is a mutual understanding of the gains from cooperation. Social cohesion is a much-
debated issue, but following Kearns and Forrest (2000), the consent seems to be around
social cohesion as a type of glue for society: The kernel of the concept is that a cohesive
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society ‘hangs together”; all the component parts somehow fit in and contribute to society’s
collective project and well-being; and conflict between societal groups, and disruptive
behaviours, are largely absent or minimal. I follow the conceptualization by Forrest and
Kearns (2001). With this as a backdrop, I outline the following elements of a socially
cohesive society, that I view as essential to the horisontal fiscal contract:
2.2.1 Social Relations
Firstly, I argue that social trust and social capital are important factors for strengthening
the horisontal fiscal contract. Trust is an important factor for generating cooperation and
norms of reciprocity (Uslaner, 1999). In a trusting society, people will be more willing to
take the risk of financing the public project, because the likelihood is big that their co-
citizens will do the same. According to Uslaner (1999, p. 122), “trust as a moral resource
leads us to look beyond our own kind”. Trust causes people to care about the needs of
others. Additionally, Uslaner (2000, p. 572) emphasizes ‘moralistic trust’, which is an
important determinant for cooperating with people we do not know.
A high level of moralistic trust facilitates cooperation and compromising, and incentivizes
people to invest in the community’s benefit. Participation in community organisations
is an important building block in a socially cohesive society because of the norms of
reciprocity and cooperation it generates (Kearns & Forrest, 2000; Uslaner, 2000). Putnam
(2000, p. 21) argues that “[c]ivic engagement and social capital entail mutual obligation
and responsibility for action”. Playing an active role in the society will form a norm
of morality. Thus, civic participation is beneficial for overcoming the collective action
problem, as “[n]etworks of community engagement foster sturdy norms of reciprocity: I’ll
do this for you now, in the expectation that you (or perhaps someone else) will return the
favour” (Putnam, 2000, p. 20).
There is, to my knowledge, not much empirical research on the relations between social
trust, and community participation, and tax compliance. Based primarily on theory, I
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hypothesise:
• H2a: The more social trust between the citizens, the higher the tax compliance
• H2b: The more participation in community organisations, the higher the tax com-
pliance
2.2.2 Common national identity
In Sub-Saharan Africa, there are more than 2000 ethnic groups with different languages,
culture and traditions (Kimenyi, 2006). According to (Easterly & Levine, 1997, p. 1206),
“[e]thnic diversity may increase polarization and thereby impede agreement about the pro-
vision of public goods”. This is both because ethnic groups often have different preferences
regarding the public goods, and because heterogeneity can reduce the ability for collective
action. As claimed by Alesina et al. (1999, p. 1243), “[w]hen individuals have different
preferences, they want to pull fewer resources together for public projects”. The common
identity found within ethnic groups creates predictability in the cooperation process, and
information about and predictability in the action of others reduces the transaction costs
of cooperation (Fearon & Laitin, 1996). That ethnic diversity is associated with lower
provision of public good is supported by findings by Alesina et al. (1999), Alesina et al.
(1999), Banerjee et al. (2005), and Miguel and Gugerty (2005).
The government can mitigate the negative effect ethnic diversity might have on tax com-
pliance, by bridging the differences between the different ethnic groups. When citizen do
not primarily identify with their ethnic group, but rather identify with the larger commu-
nity, in this case, the nation, states will be able to work better: “states will work better if
they are structured around cohesive population groups able to capitalize on their common
interests and affinities” (Kaplan, 2009, p. 470). Miguel and Gugerty (2005) find that in
Tanzania, ethnically diverse communities manage to raise fund for local public goods be-
cause of the Tanzanian nation-building approach. On the other hand, ethnically diverse
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communities in a nearby Kenyan region do not succeed. It is not necessarily a question
of cleavages, or the level of homogeneity, but rather how the different groups interact and
form a national identity. Miguel (2004, p. 32) claims that “the Kenya-Tanzania compari-
son provides suggestive microeconomic evidence that serious nation-building reforms can
successfully bridge social divisions and affect important economic outcomes, like public
goods provision”. This result in the following hypotheses:
• H3a: The larger degree of shared collective national identity, the higher the tax
compliance
• H3b: The better the government works to reduce ethnic cleavages, the higher the
tax compliance
2.2.3 Social solidarity
Kearns et al. (2014, p. 454) interpret social cohesion “as having a solidaristic foundation”.
In a socially cohesive society, there is a willingness to contribute to the needs of other.
Moreover, “It involves the recognition of the needs of the co-citizens, an interest in their
well-being and the willingness to provide assistance and to engage in collective action with
one-sided benefits.” (Kearns and Forrest, 2000, p. 999)
Forrest and Kearns (2001) emphasise the importance of a reduction wealth disparities.
Economic inequality is damaging for a society because it reduces the feeling of being a
part of a collective project – the society. Hence, assuming that paying taxes is to contribute
to a collective project, large income differences should reduce tax compliance. In a society
without economic inequality, the citizens have higher incentives to collective action. As
claimed by Kawachi and Kennedy (1997, n.p), “a widening of the gap between rich and
poor might result in damage to the social fabric”. In Japan, Yamamura (2008) finds that
economic inequality is associated with lower response rate in a collective action project.
Similarly, Vigdor (2004) found that socioeconomic inequalities in counties in the U.S. lead
to lower response rate in a collective action project.
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Poverty causes people to be “excluded from the norms of society” (Dorling, 2010, p. 92).
A case study from peri-urban Malawi finds that “poverty makes it hard for people to work
together to solve collective problems. Looking for work and eking out a precarious living
take a great deal of time and energy, leaving little to spare” (Booth & Cammack, 2013,
p. 102). After undertaking field work in a squatter settlement in Peru, Brodrecht (2012)
identifies several factors that explains the low level of collective action amongst the settlers,
all related to poverty. Absence of governmental interference provoked an individualistic
culture, where settlers had to seize what land they could, reducing attempts to work
together. This lead to the following hypotheses:
• H4a: The better the government works to reduce economic inequalities, the higher
the tax compliance
• H4b: The better the government works to prevent absolute poverty, the higher the
tax compliance
3 DATA AND MEASUREMENT
The data in this paper is drawn from round 5 of the Afrobarometer (2011-2013)2, a na-
tionally representative dataset based on interviews with respondents 3 across a number of
African countries. Afrobarometer employs the same standardized questionnaire for each
country, making the dataset especially suitable for cross-country studies. My sample con-
sists of 27 094 respondents from 28 African countries. The survey favours stable and
democratic countries, as data is lacking from especially authoritarian countries and coun-
tries with civil war. Afrobarometer uses a clustered, stratified, multi-stage area probability
sampling method. To correct for biases in the sampling method, I employ a probability
weight that adjusts the sample distribution in each country to account for individual se-
lection probabilities, as well as correcting each country to the same sample size (N=1200).
2For more information about Afrobarometer, data and questionnaires, please visit http://www.afrobarometer.org.
3Citizens of voting age, which is usually 18 years and older. The sampling universe excludes people living in areas
experiencing natural disasters or armed conflicts, in addition to residents of institutions, national parks or game reserves.
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The weight does not take into account regional effects such as colonial heritage that might
influence tax compliance 4.
3.1 Dependent Variable: Tax Compliance
The dependent variable is tax compliance - the apprehension that paying taxes is the
right thing to do. This is operationalised with the question where the respondents give
their opinion of other people that are not paying taxes they owe on their income. The
respondents states whether they think this action is ‘wrong’, ‘wrong but understandable’
or ‘wrong and punishable’.
An ideal measurement of tax compliance on the macro level is the so-called tax gap; the gap
between reported income taxes and what households actually owe (Andreoni et al., 1998).
However, measuring this is almost impossible, due to lack of exact data. Alternatively,
one could ask respondent directly about their own level of tax compliance, but also this
is problematic. Firstly, there is a problem of validity. Posing a direct question about
tax evasion can rather be a measure of the strength of the rule of law, and the level
of punishment in each country, because cheating on taxes is illegal. Moreover, earlier, I
argued in favour of a definition of tax compliance based on the concept of tax moral. This
implies a variable that captures more than the actions of the respondents. The level of
punishment for tax evasion and the strength of the rule of law in the respondent’s country
will cause a bias to this measurement. From this follows the second problem, which is
that of reliability. Tax compliance being a sensitive topic in the sense that withholding
taxes is illegal, might make it difficult to obtain a correct measure on tax compliance - a
general problem for survey data (Kinsey, 1992). 5
However, Reinikka and Svensson (2006, p. 365) argue that the formulation of the questions
4Ali et al. (2018) find that there is a difference between former English and French colonies with regard to tax
compliance, which my model will not be able to capture.
5There is, however, evidence that not paying taxes can be a form of resistance against the government. See, for
instance, Scott (1985) who describes tax evasion as a ‘weapon of the poor’, where this will be regarded favourably by
compatriots. However, as a protest against the government, also for this reason respondents would most likely underreport
tax non-compliance. Especially in low-trust countries, including many African countries, this is especially important.
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in the survey can to a certain extent bypass this bias. In their research on corruption they
use an indirect question “to avoid implicating the respondent of wrongdoing”. Ali et al.
(2014) argue in favour of a - and employ - a similar indirectly phrased question to capture
tax compliance.
Research conducted on tax compliance in other geographic regions relies on an indirect
measurement of tax compliance, see e.g. Hug and Spörri (2011) and Lago-Peñas and Lago-
Peñas (2010) for Europe, Torgler (2004) for Asia and Torgler (2005) for Latin-America.
In contrast, earlier research on tax compliance in Sub Saharan Africa, see for instance
Levi and Sacks (2009), D’Arcy (2011), and Sacks (2012) have relied on the statement
‘The tax department always has the right to make people pay taxes’. Even with an indirect
formulation, respondents might be reluctant to reveal ‘law breaking attitudes’. In this
round of Afrobarometer Round 5 when asked who they think sent the interviewer, as
many as around 36% answered the government, as opposed to around 12% answering
research company, which strengthens this concern.
However, the Afrobarometer covers around 100 questions on a wide range of topics, which
reduces the effect of framing, as opposed to a survey consisting only of questions on tax
compliance (Torgler, 2005). Thus, it remains a better measurement for this conceptualisa-
tion of tax compliance for Sub Saharan Africa, and is an improvement to earlier research
on tax compliance in this region, and, so far, to my knowledge, only used by Ali et al.
(2014). For the analysis, I follow Ali et al. (2014) and construct a dichotomous variable
of tax compliance, considering respondents as being tax compliant if they answer ‘wrong’,
and non-compliant if they answers “wrong but understandable” or “wrong and punish-
able”. Hence, the variable ’Tax compliant’ takes the value 1 if the respondent believes
that paying taxes is the right thing to do and 0 if the respondent believes that not paying
taxes is not necessarily wrong. The distribution of the dependent variable - before and
after dichotomisation - is shown in Figure 3, p. 25, in the appendix.
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3.2 Independent Variables
Next, I include the following independent variables:
• H1a: Satisfaction with public services As fiscal contract theory concerns public
services in general, I measure the respondent’s overall satisfaction with the govern-
ment’s provision of security, health care, education, roads and electricity, on a scale
from 1 “Very bad”, to 4 “Very well”. The drawback is that I am unable to test for
the relative difference between the services. 6
• H1b: Protection payment I follow Ali et al. (2014) and operationalise the state’s
provision of security is operationalised with a variable indication how frequent the
respondent has been made to pay money to non-state actors in return for protection.
The variable “Protection payment” is a scale taking the values from “Often”, to 4
Never.
• H2a: Social trust I follow Delhey and Newton (2005) and define social trust as the
generalized trust in people we know, or do not know. “Social trust” is a dichotomous
variable taking the value 1 if the respondent thinks that in general most people can
be trusted, and 0 if the respondent do not agree with this statement.
• H2b: Community participation I measure the respondent’s overall participation
in community activities consisting of attendance at community meetings and joining
with others to raise an issue during the past year (or would, if possible), on a scale
from 1 “No, would never do this”, to 5 “Yes, often”.
• H3a: Common national identity I follow D’Arcy (2011) and construct a dummy
set, measuring whether the respondent associates most with the ethnic identity, the
national identity or equal between the two. This results in the following variables
’Ethnic ID’, ’National ID’ and ’Equal ID’, where the former is the reference category,
6Both McLean (2007) and D’Arcy (2011) test only for health and education services, arguing that these are the most
central to a welfare state. The latter also finds that health matters most. Moreover, education is likely to matter most
for those with children in school age (Ali et al., 2014).
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and the two latter is expected to correlate positively with tax compliance.
• H3b: Ethnic group treated unfair I measure how the often the respondent feel
the government is discriminating towards the respondent’s ethnic group on a scale
from 1 “Never”, to 4 “Always”.
• H4a and b: Social solidarity To measure the two dimensions of social solidarity,
I employ two different variables where the respondent evaluate the government’s
performance on (1) reducing the income gap in the society, and (2) on in-
creasing the living standards for the poor, on a scale from 1 “Very badly” to
4 “Very well”.
• Control variables: I use the following control variables: (i) Tax deterrence, oper-
ationalised by the perceived difficulty to avoid taxes. This variable, I also assume
to measure the trust that others are paying their taxes as well. (ii) political trust,
measured with a scale consisting of a scale measuring the respondent’s trust in trust
in president/ prime minister, trust in the parliament/ national assembly and trust
in the courts of law. (iii) Level of perceived corruption amongst tax officials. (iv)
Tax knowledge, in order to avoid a possible spurious effect of human capital. Lastly,
I include several socio-demographic control variables: Gender, age, urban/ rural,
education, if the respondent has a job or not, and wealth.
4 ANALYSIS
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Firstly, descriptive statistics of the variables is presented in Table 1.
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Tax compliance attitude 0.508 0.5 0 1 27094
Satisfaction public services 2.394 0.690 1 4 27094
Difficulty to avoid taxes 3.173 0.781 1 4 27094
Political trust 2.765 0.86 1 4 27094
Corruption tax officials 2.453 0.854 1 4 27094
Tax knowledge dummy 0.833 0.373 0 1 27094
Female 0.466 0.499 0 1 27094
Age 36.757 13.944 18 100 27094
Education 4.344 2.068 1 10 27094
Urban 0.389 0.487 0 1 27094
Job 0.36 0.48 0 1 27094
Wealth 0.791 0.406 0 1 27094
4.2 Logistic analysis
I estimate the probability of a respondent having a tax compliant attitude, given the values
on the different explanatory variables with the following logit model:
LT ax Compliant = α+ βX1 + γX2 + δX3 + ζX4 + ηD1 + εi (1)
Where X1 expresses the independent variables for the provision of public goods, X2 ex-
presses the independent variables on citizen-citizen relations, X3 represents the attitude
control variables and X4 represents the socio-demographic control variables, and ε is the
error term. D1 represents a dummy set for all countries in the analysis, taking 28 values,
included in order to correct for country-specific differences. Table 4 in the appendix shows
the marginal effects for this model. Logit coefficients and test statistics are also reported
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in the appendix; in Table 5 on page 28.
First, in Model 1, I include the two variables measuring ‘the vertical fiscal contract’. Both
satisfaction with public services and protection payment have a significant impact on tax
compliance; the former having the expected positive effect, and the latter the expected
negative effect. Next, in model 2, I test H2a and H2b by adding the variables measuring
social trust and participation in community activites. The latter is not significant, whereas
social trust has an unexpected negative effect, significant on a 0.01 level. In model 3,
testing H3a and H3b, I add both the dummy set measuring the respondents national vs.
ethnic group identification, and the variable measuring unfair treatment by the governent
based on ethnicity. The results show that - unexpectedly - it seems that those identifying
with their nationality has a lower probability of being tax compliant compared to those
who identify strongest with their ethnic group. Finally, in model 4, I test H4a and H4b by
adding the variables measuring the perception of the government’s performance in reducing
poverty, and narrowing the income gap. The result is an expected significant positive effect
of the government reducing poverty, whereas the effect of reduction in income inequality
is not significant. However, this model has a problem with multicollinearity, as shown by
the Variance Inflation Factors in Table 3 on p. 26 in the appendix. This seems to be
mainly problematic for the variables measuring the state’s role, such as the satisfaction
with public services, reducing poverty, and political trust, which all have extremenly high
values of VIF. The consequence is that the results might be less reliable, which should be
kept in mind in the discussion that follows.
The control variables remain largely significant, demonstrating that political trust has
a positive impact on tax compliance, wheras corruption among tax officals reduces the
probability of tax compliance. Citizens who express tax compliant attitudes are most
likely male, older, and educated. There seems to be no significant difference between
urban and rural areas, but being employed has a negative effect. Next, the more difficult
to avoid paying taxes, the higher probability of having a tax compliant attitude. Finally,
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knowledge about taxes seems to be an important driver for tax compliant attitudes.
4.3 Discussion
Based on the results in model 4 (Table 4), I confirm H1a, that the better the government
provides public services, the higher the tax compliance, on a 0.001 level of significance.
A 1 unit increase in the level of satisfaction with public services causes a 2.6 percentage
point increase in the probability of tax compliant attitude. I can also keep H1b, that the
more the individuals pay non-state actors for protection, the lower the tax compliance,
on a 0.001 level of significance. A 1 unit increanse in how often an individual pays for
protection reduces the probability of being tax compliant with 5.26 percentage points.
A 1 unit increase satisfaction with the government’s work to reduce poverty increases
the probability of expressing a tax compliant attitude with 2.26 percentage points. The
findings provide empirical support to the fiscal contract theory presented by Tilly (1990),
Levi (1988), and Schumpeter (1991). It also confirms earlier cross-country findings from
Ali et al. (2014) and D’Arcy (2011).
Next, I hypothesized that the more the government works to prevent absolute poverty, the
higher the tax compliance (H4b), which my findings confirm. The solidaristic foundation
of social cohesion as presented by Kearns et al. (2014) does seem to explain a part of the
variation in tax compliance. In a socially cohesive society, the citizens willingly spend
a portion of their own income to help others. A government striving to increase tax
compliance can promote these values by reducing the level of absolute poverty in the
society. Moreover, this supports the theory of Levi (1988), that the government can have
an impact on the citizens’ tax compliance by coordinating them. However, improving
living standards of the poor do not necessarily mean reducing cleavages per se, as it says
nothing about how the government should act towards the richer groups in the society.
This variable does not say anything about the initial level of the government’s attempt
to fight poverty in the community. One possible error in this type of measurement is
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TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES
H1a: The better the government’s public services, the higher the tax compliance +
H1b: The more payment to non-state security actor, the lower the tax compliance +
H2a: The more social trust between the citizens, the higher the tax compliance -
H2b: The more participation in community organisations, the higher the tax compliance -
H3a: The larger degree of shared collective national identity, the higher the tax compliance. -
H3b: The better the government works to reduce ethnic cleavages, the higher the tx compliance. -
H4a: The better the government works to reduce economic inequalities, the higher the tax compliance. -
H4b: The better the government works to prevent absolute poverty, the higher the tax compliance. +
that it could be rather selfish. Even though the government is not really investing in
improving the living conditions for the poor, it might be that in the respondent’s view,
this is ‘enough’. Finally, this variable can to a certain extent capture the same as the
variable measuring satifaction with public services, as a welfare state could be a tool to
reduce poverty. Thus, it might be that in fact, this variable is better suited to measure
the vertical fiscal contract, as it asks about the citizens attitudes towards the state, not
towards each other.
5 ANALYSIS - NEXT STEPS
The analysis could be improved in several ways. Firstly, the binary logistic analysis should
include a robustness check with an ordered logit model, considering the nature of the
original dependent variable. Next, the aim is to make this into a multilevel model. In
that way, I will be able to control for country specific factors such as GDP, QoG, and
tax to GDP ratio. Moreover, it will be a further contribution as this as not been done
before using these variables, to my knowledge. There is reason to believe that country
matters specific factors matter, and that these should be accounted for, a concern that is
strengthened by looking at the country dummies which are largely significant (full model
with country dummies not shown here - available upon request).
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6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper set out to answer the following question: How do the relations between citizens
matter for tax compliance?? The main findings in this paper are that (i) the more sat-
isfaction with public services, the higher the tax compliance, (ii) paying non-state actors
for security reduces tax compliance, and (iii) a government that works to reduce absolute
poverty increases tax compliance. Table 2 presents a summary of the hypotheses. This
leads me to the conclusion that the prerequisites in the society for tax compliance is mainly
a welfare state - thus the state’s role - , rather than the concepts directly related to social
cohesion. Introducing social cohesion as a theoretical framework did not yield empirical
results that increased the understanding of tax compliance in Sub-Saharan Africa. The
vertical contract appears to be more important than the hypothesised horisontal fiscal
contract. However, it is too early to eliminate this argument altogether, especially as,
limited by time and scope, I have not emphasized enough the institutional factors. More
thorough analysis is needed to fully understand the complexity of the fiscal contract.
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TABLE 3. VARIANCE INFLATION FACTORS FOR MODEL 4
VIF
Satisfaction public services 19.64
Protection payment 5.58




Ethnic group treated unfair by govt 4.76
Govt reducing poverty 10.38
Govt narrowing income gap 9.09
Difficulty to avoid taxes 16.66
Political trust 14.33
Corruption tax officials 9.98
Tax knowledge dummy 7.08
Female 1.98
Age 8.79
Education 7.42
Urban 2.08
Job 1.79
Wealth 5.38
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